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Introduction
The last decades have seen much debate about privatisation of public …rms and liberalisation of markets. During the seventies and eighties, people became more and more sceptical about the performance of public companies.
The lack of pro…t motive and the absence of competition would give public organisations insu¢ cient incentive to produce e¢ ciently, resulting in too low productivity, too high employment, and, hence, excessively high cost. This debate has led to an ongoing wave of privatisation of public companies, usually accompanied by introducing or strengthening competition among …rms in the market. The empirical literature by and large supports the notion that privatisation and liberalisation increases e¢ ciency. Megginson and Netter (2001) provide an extensive survey of the empirical literature and conclude that privatisation leads to an increase in productivity. Employment usually falls, unless the …rm is able to increase its sales substantially. Another recent survey, by Kikeri and Nellis (2002) , reaches similar conclusions. 1 This paper develops a model to examine the consequences of creating a fully competitive market in a sector previously dominated by a cost-minimising public …rm. Our model implies that …rms in a competitive environment in- 1 To what extent the mere change of ownership (privatisation) or the strengthening of competition (liberalisation) is responsible for e¢ ciency gains is still unclear. As privatisation and liberalisation often take place simultaneously, it is hard to disentangle the e¤ects empirically (Kikeri and Nellis, 2002) . duce workers to exert more e¤ort on average than the public …rm. Hence, productivity increases and the sector's employment decreases after liberalising the sector. Even though liberalisation thus improves allocative e¢ ciency of the economy, prices of the sector's output rise. The reason is that liberalising the sector not only intensi…es competition between …rms in the product market, but also in the labour market.
An important element of our model is that workers in the economy di¤er in their intrinsic motivation to work in the sector, which is their private information. 2 We assume that there are two types of workers, high-motivation and low-motivation workers, and that the number of high-motivation workers is su¢ ciently limited so that workers of both types are employed in the sector. As high-motivation workers …nd working in the sector less costly than low-motivation workers, they work harder and are willing to work for a lower wage. If production takes place within a single public …rm, this …rm has monopsony power over the high-motivation workers and, hence, can attract them at lower cost than …rms in a competitive environment. Moreover, we
show that the public …rm can further reduce wage cost by demanding relatively little e¤ort from low-motivation workers and reducing their wage ac- 2 Equivalently, we can assume that workers di¤er in a hidden (sector-speci…c) innate ability, as in a standard adverse selection model (see for a recent overview La¤ont and Martimort, 2002) . Related applications include Jeon and La¤ont (1999) on public sector downsizing and Booth and Zoega (2002) on the e¤ects of competition. In contrast to our paper, these papers do not endogenize workers'e¤ort. cordingly. Although this increases the wage cost per unit of low-motivation workers' output, it enables the monopsonist to extract even more motivational rents from the high-motivation workers, because the low-motivation worker's contract becomes less attractive for high-motivation workers. However, the low e¤ort of low-motivation workers implies that more workers need to be hired to meet demand for the sector's output, which is costly. To o¤set part of these cost, the public …rm demands higher e¤ort from the highmotivation workers. When the sector is liberalised, competition among …rms for the high-motivation workers results in contracts where each worker is paid his full marginal product. As a result, low-motivation workers exert more effort and high-motivation workers exert less e¤ort. On average, productivity increases and, hence, employment falls. Low-motivation workers earn more after liberalisation, whereas the e¤ect on the wage of high-motivation workers is ambiguous. On average, wage cost per unit of output increase, implying that prices are higher after liberalisation. 3 The model's implications concerning productivity and employment are well in line with the empirical …ndings mentioned above. 4 Our result on the 3 Note that the public-private distinction is not crucial. For convenience, we label the monopsonist by 'public …rm', but all results carry over to the case where production before liberalisation takes place in a single private …rm, provided that regulation blocks the …rm from exercising monopoly power. For a further discussion of this issue, see the concluding section. 4 The empirical literature often attributes the increase in productivity to the provision of stronger monetary incentives (Megginson et al., 1994 , Martin and Parker, 1997 , Kikeri and Nellis, 2002 . The productivity increase in our model is driven by the increase in e¤ort level of wages seems to square less well with common belief. Indeed, it is often claimed that workers bear the burden of privatisation and liberalisation not only through job losses, but also through lower wages. The empirical literature, however, suggests otherwise as regards wages. Kikeri and Nellis (2002) observe that "in many instances, and contrary to popular perception, those who retain their jobs in privatised …rms receive higher wages, sometimes substantially so" (p. 18). For the UK, e¤ects on wages appear to be mixed (Haskel and Szymanski, 1993, Martin and Parker, 1997) . The most comprehensive study is by La Porta and López-de-Silanes (1999) for Mexico, where a massive process of privatisation and liberalisation has taken place.
They report large increases in real wages of the privatised …rms while overall real wages throughout Mexico stagnated. 5 In addition, they asked …rms why they increased worker's pay: Interestingly, "matching the conditions o¤ered by similar …rms"was listed as an important reason for the increase in wages after privatisation. La Porta and López-de-Silanes (1999) also examine the e¤ect of privatisation on prices. Prices tend to increase, albeit modestly.
demanded from low-motivation workers, which can be interpreted as provision of stronger …nancial incentives. In a related paper, we argue that the …nding that public organisations make far less use of monetary incentive schemes than private …rms -often considered as a signal of ine¢ ciency of public organisations (cf. Metcalfe, 1999 and -can be rationalised by the exploitation of monopsony power by public …rms (Delfgaauw and Dur, 2008) . 5 The increase in wages is not con…ned to executive compensation: real wages of bluecollar workers rose even more than those of white-collar workers. Moreover, only a small part of the increase in wages can be attributed to composition e¤ects. See Section V in La Porta and López-de-Silanes (1999).
There is surprisingly little other evidence on how privatisation and liberalisation a¤ect prices (cf. Megginson and Netter, 2001 ).
Commonly used examples of sectors where workers'intrinsic motivation plays an important role are health care and education (Besley and Ghatak, 2003) . Our model's predictions are well in line with recent experiences in these sectors. For instance, in Sweden, wages in the health-care sector have risen at three times the earlier rate, and have become more closely tied to individual performance, since private companies began competing with public units (Hjertqvist, 2001 ). Likewise, Hoxby (1994) , Merri…eld (1999) , and Vedder and Hall (2000) show that competition from private schools increases teacher salaries at public schools in the US. Furthermore, Hoxby (2002) …nds that school competition creates a more high-powered incentive environment within the teaching profession. 6 Empirical studies also show that competition among schools raises school productivity substantially (Hoxby, 1994 and and enhances the work e¤ort of teachers (Rapp, 2000) .
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses related literature.
Next, Section 3 presents our model. In Section 4, we derive the optimal contracts in case of full information as a benchmark. In Section 5, we derive optimal contracts when workers'motivation is private information, and discuss the distributional consequences of moving from public monopsony to competitive market. Section 6 concludes. we focus on the e¤ects of a decrease in …rm's power in the labour market.
Related Literature
In practise, liberalisation will a¤ect employment and wages through both channels. The empirical evidence discussed in the Introduction, particularly the evidence on wages, suggests that the e¤ects arising from a decrease in monopsony power may dominate, at least in some important cases.
Our model closely relates to the literature on screening of workers'ability following the seminal work by Spence (1973) and Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) . While in a standard adverse selection model (see e.g. La¤ont and Martimort, 2002), a …rm hires a …xed number of workers, we study optimal contracts when the …rm has to meet demand for its product and the supply of 'high-type'workers is limited. As we will see, this implies that not only the low-type workers' contract is distorted, but also the contract for the high-type workers.
A number of recent papers stress the importance of workers' intrinsic motivation for optimal incentive schemes and e¤ort, particularly in pub- 
The Model
The model revolves around production of a homogeneous product in a particular sector of the economy. Production takes place either in one public organisation or in private …rms which compete in price. For convenience, we assume a very simple production technology and very simple product demand characteristics. All …rms in the sector, including the public …rm in case of public production, have the same technology in which labour is the only input factor. Output depends linearly on workers'e¤ort e, and we normalise the marginal product of e¤ort to unity. Introducing (dis)economies of scale in production does not a¤ect the results as long as it does not preclude competition. Demand for the sector's product is assumed to be perfectly price inelastic and denoted by Q d . 7 We assume that in case of public production, the public …rm minimises the cost of producing Q d and sets the price p equal to average cost, such that it runs a balanced budget. In case of a competitive market, private …rms compete in price, and so equilibrium pro…ts are zero.
Workers in the economy di¤er in their intrinsic motivation to work in the sector, otherwise they are identical. When working outside the sector, workers obtain utility U o . If worker i is employed in the sector, his utility is described by:
where w i is the wage and i measures the cost of exerting e¤ort for worker i.
Heterogeneity in i among workers may stem from di¤erences in an ability relevant for production in this sector, leading to di¤erences in productivity.
Alternatively, we interpret the heterogeneity in i as stemming from di¤er-ences in workers' intrinsic motivation to work in this sector. Thus, some workers enjoy working in the sector more than others, which results in lower (net) cost of e¤ort.
For simplicity, we assume that there are only two types of workers in the economy, high-motivation workers (h) and low-motivation workers (l).
High-motivation workers dislike exerting e¤ort in this sector less than lowmotivation workers: h < l . Equation (1) captures in a simple way the ideas that workers di¤er in the extent to which they are motivated to work in the sector and that motivation matters for workers' e¤ort. The sectorspeci…city of motivation is important for the results as it gives the public …rm monopsonistic power. In contrast, di¤erences between workers'general work motivation would not give the public …rm monopsonistic power as general motivation is valuable in many di¤erent jobs in the economy.
While worker's motivation is private information, …rms observe workers' e¤ort. To attract workers, …rms o¤er contracts specifying a wage and a required level of e¤ort. Worker i is willing to work in the sector if
Substituting (1) gives:
high-motivation workers just indi¤erent between working for the public …rm and taking the outside option. We assume that product demand Q d is su¢ -ciently high (or that the number of high-motivation workers in the economy is su¢ ciently low) such that in equilibrium the sector also employs some low-motivation workers. 8 Denoting the number of high-motivation workers in the economy by H, the number of low-motivation workers employed in the sector by L, and the required level of e¤ort for worker type i by e i , total employment in the sector is given by:
For convenience, we assume that there is an in…nite supply of low-motivation workers.
4 First-best: Observable Types
Competitive Market
In the competitive market, …rms compete in prices. Hence, pro…ts are bid away to zero and workers are paid their full marginal revenue product. E¤ort and wage for a worker of type i are being chosen to maximise surplus given the prevailing price for output p, subject to the employing …rm breaking even and the worker being willing to accept the job:
The solution to this optimisation problem gives an individual worker's supply
curve:
Summing equation (4) high-motivation and low-motivation workers are willing to accept a job in the sector. By our assumption that supply of low-motivation workers is in…-nite, the supply curve is horizontal. Following (4), high-motivation workers exert e¤ort
, while low-motivation workers exert e¤ort
. 9 Hence, since l > h , high-motivation workers exert more e¤ort than low-motivation workers.
Summing up, the sector supply curve is horizontal at price
), and horizontal at price p 2 l U o over the range
; +1]. The equilibrium price follows from equating this sector supply curve with the sector demand curve. Note that our assumption of perfectly price-inelastic demand implies that the sector demand curve is vertical at level Q d . It follows that when product demand Q d is su¢ ciently high such that in equilibrium the sector also employs some low-motivation workers (more precisely:
), the equilibrium price in the competitive market is equal to:
9 Clearly, the price equals marginal cost of e¤ort of both high-motivation and lowmotivation workers. This can be seen by noting that the marginal cost of e¤ort of a worker of type i equals i e i , e¤ort is given by e i = The price of the sector's output increases in low-motivation workers'cost of e¤ort and in workers'outside option utility. Using (4) and (5) and the zeropro…t condition pe i w i = 0, we can solve for worker i's wage in equilibrium:
Clearly, as l > h , high-motivation workers earn more than low-motivation workers. Moreover, substituting (4) and (6) into the utility function (1), it follows that high-motivation workers'utility is higher than their outside option utility. In contrast, low-motivation workers do not earn a rent. Note that in the competitive equilibrium, the price of the sector's output depends neither on the di¤erence in the cost of e¤ort between high-and low-motivation workers nor on the number of high-motivation workers in the economy. The reason is that high-motivation workers receive all of the rents from their motivation.
Lastly, employment is found by substituting the equilibrium values of e¤ort (4) and the equilibrium price (5) into (3):
Employment increases in demand for the sector's product and in workers' cost of e¤ort. Employment decreases in the workers' outside option utility and in the number of high-motivation workers.
Public Monopsony
Let us now consider the case of a public …rm (or regulated private …rm) which is the sole supplier of output Q d . Entry of …rms is blocked by government regulation. The government induces the public …rm to minimise the cost of producing Q d and to set price p equal to average production cost. 10 For the moment, we simply assume that the public …rm …nds it optimal to hire some low-motivation workers in addition to all of the economy's high-motivation workers. At the end of this subsection, we derive the exact condition on the level of demand Q d under which this is the case.
As the public …rm is the only supplier of jobs within the sector and worker types are observable, the public …rm optimally sets wages such that the participation constraint (2) is binding for both worker types. The public …rm's optimisation problem is to minimise total cost 10 In the absence of agency problems, the government can o¤er a contract to the manager of the public …rm to deliver Q d at the minimum price p, which is derived below. Pro…t maximisation by the …rm then results in cost minimisation, as in (8) below. This also holds in case of unobservable worker types.
with respect to the e¤ort levels e h and e l , the wages of both worker types w h and w l , and the number of low-motivation workers L, subject to the production constraint (3) and to the participation constraint (2) of both worker types. Using these constraints to eliminate w h , w l , and L, we can derive …rst-order conditions for the optimal level of e¤ort of high-and lowmotivation workers, respectively:
Solving (9) and (10) for e l and e h gives:
Hence, the optimal e¤ort levels are identical to those arising in the perfectly competitive market. It follows that employment is also equal to the level of employment arising in a competitive market. Substituting for e i in participation constraint (2) gives the wage of worker i:
Hence, whereas low-motivation workers receive exactly the same wage as under perfect competition, its monopsony power enables the public …rm to attract the high-motivation workers at a lower wage than …rms in a competitive market. Lastly, the price of the sector's product is set equal to average cost:
where the second equality follows from substituting (8) and using the results above for wages and employment. Comparing with (5), it follows from l > h that the price under public monopsony is lower than the price that arises in a perfectly competitive market. The di¤erence between the price under competition and the price under monopsony decreases in the cost of e¤ort of high-motivation workers and increases in the number of high-motivation workers.
Summarizing, when workers' types are observable, the only di¤erence between the contracts o¤ered in the competitive market and by the public monopsonist is that high-motivation workers receive a lower wage under public monopsony. Firms in a competitive market compete for the services of the relatively productive high-motivation workers, which drives up their wage.
In contrast, the public monopsonist can extract all motivational rents from the high-motivation workers, as it is the only supplier of jobs for which the high-motivation workers are intrinsically motivated. The lower wage cost are re ‡ected in a lower price of the sector's product.
The results above depend on the assumption that both high-and lowmotivation workers are employed by the public monopsonist. It is easy to verify that, in this case of observable types, this happens under the same con-
) under which …rms in a competitive market hire both types of workers. The reason is intuitive: Both private …rms and the public monopsonist …nd it optimal to hire low-motivation workers when the marginal cost of output produced by high-motivation workers exceeds the marginal cost of output produced by low-motivation workers. As we shall see, this is di¤erent when worker types are private information.
Second-best: Unobservable Types
When …rms cannot observe whether a worker is highly motivated or not,
contracts cannot be made contingent on worker type. This implies that in addition to the participation constraints, contracts must ful…ll the incentive compatibility constraints: high-motivation workers must prefer the contract designed to attract a high-motivation worker over the contract designed to attract a low-motivation worker, and vice versa. Thus, contracts specifying wage w i and required e¤ort e i must satisfy:
Competitive Market
Using (14), it is easily veri…ed that the …rst-best contracts derived in Section 4.1 are incentive compatible. Hence, in case of competition with unobservable worker types, the incentive compatibility constraints are redundant and the …rst-best arises. Proposition 1 summarises the competitive equilibrium.
Proposition 1 Under perfect competition, the optimal contract for worker i has wage w i = 2 l U o = i and e¤ort e i = p 2 l U o = i . In equilibrium, employment and the price of the sector's product are, respectively, given by:
Public Monopsony
In contrast to the …rst-best contracts under competition, the …rst-best contracts under public monopsony are not incentive compatible: high-motivation workers prefer the …rst-best contract designed for low-motivation workers.
11
Hence, when the public …rm hires low-motivation workers in addition to all high-motivation workers, it is forced to leave some rents to the highmotivation workers. 12 As in the standard adverse selection model, the participation constraint of the low-motivation type and the incentive compatibility constraint of the high-motivation type bind. Thus, the public …rm sets contracts and the number of low-motivation workers L so as to minimise total cost (8), subject to the participation constraint of low-motivation workers (2), the incentive compatibility constraint of high-motivation workers (14) , and the production constraint (3). Proposition 2 describes how the resulting equilibrium under public monopsony compares to the competitive equilibrium.
Proposition 2 Compared to the competitive equilibrium, the equilibrium un-11 This can be easily veri…ed: Using (11), (12), (13), and (14), it follows that highmotivation workers strictly prefer the …rst-best contract for low-motivation workers if
Since h < l , this condition always holds. 12 As a result, the condition on demand Q d under which the public monopsonist …nds it optimal to hire both types of workers is more stringent than in the previous cases. Appendix A shows that a su¢ cient condition under which both high-and low-motivation workers are employed by the public monopsonist is:
We assume that this condition is satis…ed.
der public monopsony has the following features:
(i) Low-motivation workers exert less e¤ort and high-motivation workers exert more e¤ort;
(ii) Average productivity is lower and total employment is higher;
(iii) Wages of low-motivation workers are lower, wages of high-motivation workers can be higher or lower, but the average wage is always lower;
(iv) The price of the sector's product is lower.
Proof. The proof for parts (i), (ii), and (iii) are given in Appendix B. Part (iv) follows immediately from the …nding that the cost-minimising public …rm o¤ers di¤erent contracts than …rms in the competitive market.
The intuition behind these results is as follows. The cost-minimising public …rm wants to extract as much rents as possible from the high-motivation workers, but rent extraction is hampered by the revelation constraint. Reducing the e¤ort requirement in the contract for low-motivation workers allows the public …rm to reduce the wage for low-motivation workers. As lowmotivation workers have higher cost of exerting e¤ort than high-motivation workers, this wage reduction is relatively large, which makes the low-motivation workers' contract less attractive for high-motivation workers. As a result, more rents can be extracted from high-motivation workers.
The reduction in low-motivation workers'e¤ort increases the cost per unit of low-motivation workers'output and necessitates an increase in employment (i.e. in L) so as to keep production at Q d . The costs of this distortion can be reduced through an increase in the e¤ort requirement for high-motivation workers. Hence, by distorting the contract for high-motivation workers, the public …rm can reduce the cost of distorting the contract for low-motivation workers. 13 In the optimum, total pay per unit of e¤ort is higher for low-motivation workers than for high-motivation workers. As the public …rm runs a balanced budget, it follows that the agency makes a loss on the input of low-motivation workers, while it makes a pro…t on the input of high-motivation workers. In a competitive environment, a competing …rm could attract the pro…table high-motivation workers by o¤ering them a contract with the same wage but a slightly lower e¤ort requirement than the contract o¤ered by the public …rm. In equilibrium, …rms in competition are forced to pay workers their full marginal revenue product, as derived above. 13 None of the results change if high-motivation workers also derive some constant intrinsic bene…ts from working in the sector (e.g. stemming from pride to work in the sector). As both high-motivation and low-motivation workers are needed in the sector, the participation constraint of high-motivation workers is never binding, implying that neither the public …rm nor the private …rms can extract any of these constant bene…ts from the high-motivation workers.
The model's implications for the e¤ects of liberalisation of markets, which are described in Corollary 1, square well with the empirical observations mentioned in the Introduction.
Corollary 1 Liberalisation of a public monopsony leads to an increase in average productivity, a decrease in employment, an increase in average wages for retained employees, and a higher price of the sector's product.
The welfare consequences of liberalisation are straightforward. Total production in the economy increases as a result of liberalisation because more workers become available for other sectors of the economy. Social welfare (de…ned as the sum of utilities of all workers in the economy) also increases, see Appendix C. Low-motivation workers throughout the economy nevertheless lose, as their job-related utility remains at U o while they have to pay a higher price for the sector's output. 14 High-motivation workers gain all of the surplus from liberalising the sector. As high-motivation workers in a particular sector are a small group, the distributional consequences of liberalisation may well hinder its political viability. Insofar as politicians want to please the public at large, our analysis can thus be viewed as a positive theory of distortionary regulation. 15 14 The low-motivation workers who remain employed in the sector earn a higher income but the utility gain from higher income is annuled by the utility loss of exerting more e¤ort. 15 In this respect, the paper relates to the optimal taxation literature where the government redistributes income from high-ability workers to low-ability workers at the cost
Concluding Remarks
This paper has developed a model which can explain the empirical observations that …rms in a competitive market provide stronger monetary incentives, reach higher productivity, employ less workers, and pay higher wages than a public monopsony. We have argued that by inducing workers with little intrinsic motivation to exert little e¤ort, a monopsonist can reduce the wage cost of highly motivated workers, which is not possible for …rms in a competitive environment. Our model implies that strengthening competition between …rms may raise wage cost and, thus, output prices. Hence, liberalisation of a sector may particularly favour the workers who remain employed in the sector at the expense of the public at large. Political support for liberalisation may therefore be limited, even though liberalisation improves allocative e¢ ciency of the economy.
We have compared two extreme cases, a competitive market without any market failures and a publicly owned or regulated monopolist without any government failures. Clearly, allowing for market failures and government failures could alter the results. For instance, barriers to entry or strategic deterrence by the incumbent …rm may imply that, after privatisation or of distortions in work incentives (Mirrlees, 1971) . In the present paper, the government abstains from liberalisation and distorts work incentives in the public …rm so as to extract rents from highly motivated workers. As in the optimal taxation literature, we assume that the government can not identify workers'types. deregulation, an imperfectly competitive market arises in which …rms can exploit their market power, both in the output market as well as in the labour market. Government failures may also have important implications for the e¤ects of privatisation and liberalisation. As noted in Section 2, several papers have stressed that public …rms may be susceptible to capture by lobbied politicians, trade unions, and other interest groups, implying that cost-minimisation is not the sole objective of public …rms (see Haskel and Szymanski, 1993 , and Boyco, Schleifer, and Vishny, 1996, among others).
Insofar as interest groups aim to protect the interests of the public …rm's work force, job losses may be larger and wage increases smaller (or even negative) after liberalisation. Further, if the government cannot perfectly regulate a pro…t-maximising monopolist, e.g. due to information asymmetries, then the …rm may limit production (and hence employment) so as to raise the price of output. Creating a competitive market may then lead to lower prices and higher employment as the …rm can no longer exploit its monopoly power. In practice, it seems likely that liberalisation of a sector reduces both monopoly power and monopsony power, implying that the effect of liberalisation on prices and employment is ambiguous. Allowing for monopoly power of the public …rm does not a¤ect our results on the optimal contracts, as it is also in the interest of a monopolist to exploit its monopsony power so as to reduce wage costs. This may explain why the empirical evidence on the e¤ect of liberalisation on wages and incentive pay is more conclusive than the evidence on prices and employment.
Appendices A Condition for Hiring Low-Motivation Workers by a Public Monopsonist
As in the case of observable worker types, if demand is low (
then the public …rm hires a limited number of high-motivation workers. For higher levels of demand, the public monopsonist hires all high-motivation workers. The issue is under which condition the public monopsonist …nds it optimal to also hire low-motivation workers. Suppose the public …rm only hires high-motivation workers. Then, the public …rm o¤ers a contract which satis…es the participation constraint of the high-motivation workers. In order to meet demand, the public …rm must induce each high-motivation worker to exert Q d =H units of e¤ort. Substituting this level of e¤ort into the participation constraint (2) to …nd the wage required to attract the high-motivation workers, we …nd that cost per unit of output are given by:
If the public …rm hires both high-and low-motivation workers, average cost per unit of output are given by
In the proof of Proposition 2 below, we show that the public …rm optimally distorts e h and e l . Unfortunately, closed-form solutions for e h and e l and, hence, for w h and w l cannot be derived. However, since the contracts o¤ered by the cost-minimising public …rm di¤er from those o¤ered in the competitive market, cost per unit of e¤ort are lower under public monopsony than in the competitive market, given that both high-and low-motivation workers are employed in the sector. Hence, a su¢ cient condition on demand Q d so that the public …rm …nds it optimal to hire both types of workers is that the cost per unit of output as given by (A1) are higher than the cost per unit of output in the competitive market when …rms hire both types of workers.
The latter equals p 2 l U o , see Section 5.1. Hence, a su¢ cient condition is:
which can be rewritten as condition (15) in the main text.
B Proof of Proposition 2 Proof of part (i)
The public …rm sets contracts and the number of low-motivation workers L so as to minimise total cost (8), subject to the participation constraint of low-motivation workers (2), the incentive compatibility constraint of highmotivation workers (14) , and the production constraint (3). Using these constraints to eliminate w h , w l , and L, we can derive …rst-order conditions for the optimal level of e¤ort of high-and low-motivation workers, respectively:
We can not derive explicit solutions for the optimal values of e l and e h .
We can, however, compare them with the e¤ort levels in the competitive equilibrium. The e¤ort of low-motivation workers in the competitive case equals p 2 l U o = l . Substituting this into (A3), the second term becomes zero. Hence, as the …rst term is positive, the public agency sets e l below the competitive level. Using this result, it follows from (A2) that e h is larger than the e¤ort level of high-motivation workers in the competitive equilibrium.
Proof of part (ii)
Given that total production and the number of high-motivation workers are …xed at Q d and H, respectively, for the results on employment and average productivity it su¢ ces to show that the number of low-motivation workers employed in the sector is higher under public monopsony than under competition. Total employment under competition is given by (7), implying that the number of low-motivation workers under competition L C is:
Using (A2) to substitute for e h in the expression for total employment (3) gives the number of low-motivation workers under public monopsony L P as a function of e l :
The marginal e¤ect of e l on L P is given by: This completes the proof that the public …rm sets
2 l U o = l , and hence it follows that L P > L C .
Proof of part (iii)
The wage of low-motivation workers is increasing in e l , as given by participation constraint (2) . First-order condition (A3) shows that the optimal level of e¤ort of low-motivation workers is smaller under public monopsony than in the competitive equilibrium. Hence, the wage of low-motivation workers is lower under public monopsony.
Under competition, high-motivation workers' wage is 2 l U o = h . Using (A2) to substitute for e h in the incentive compatibility constraint for highmotivation workers (14) gives the following expression for the wage under public monopsony as a function of e l :
As the second derivative @ 2 w h =@e 2 l > 0 for e l > 0, it follows that w h has only one minimum. We cannot derive the levels of e l for which w h equals 2 l U o = h . However, substituting the level of e¤ort of low-motivation workers under competition e l = p 2 l U o = l into (A6), we …nd that:
At this level of e¤ort, a decrease in e l leads to a lower wage for high-motivation workers:
Hence, initially, the decrease in low-motivation workers' e¤ort leads to a decrease in high-motivation workers' wage. However, we cannot be sure that for lower values of of e l , it is never optimal for the public …rm to set
Lastly, the average wage per worker is simply total cost divided by total employment. As cost are lower and employment is higher under monopsony, it follows that average wage per worker is lower under monopsony than under competition.
C Maximising Social Welfare
Suppose the public …rm maximises the sum of utilities of all workers in the economy. Since utility is linear in income, we can write the social welfare function as:
where K is the total number of low-motivation workers in the economy, C is the cost of production of the sector's output, and we have imposed that Q d is su¢ ciently large such that it is optimal for the public …rm to hire also lowmotivation workers, as in the main text. Our assumption of price-inelastic demand implies that the utility from the sector's output is a constant, so we can safely ignore it. Substituting total cost C, described in (8) , and the workers' utility function (1) with i = l and i = h, respectively, into (A7)
gives after some rewriting:
Note that the wages paid by the public agency do not a¤ect social welfare, but must satisfy the low-motivation workers'participation constraint (2) and the high-motivation workers revelation constraint (14) . Substituting the production constraint (3) into (A7) and maximising with respect to e h and e l gives exactly the same …rst-order conditions as in the …rst-best outcome, (9) and (10) . This implies that e¤ort levels and, hence, employment are the same as in the competitive equilibrium.
